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INTRODUCTION
Atrial is an enquiry into the facts of past events.1Therewill always be a separation
between the evidence and the material facts. This may generate uncertainty and
disagreement about the facts of the case, and provoke controversy about the
objectives of evidence law and the rationality of the fact-¢nding enterprise. This
is the terrain covered byAlex Stein’s recent Foundations of Evidence Law.
Stein has previously theorised many rules and principles of evidence law.2
Much of this work is incorporated into his new book, recast as supposedly coher-
ent elements of a larger theory. Stein defends the edi¢ce of evidence law against
free proof abolitionists who view it as ramshackle, sprawling, and crying out for
demolition.3 Stein’s normative agenda is heavily grounded in existing institutions
and doctrine, and he often makes substantial descriptive claims.4
Stein’s project is ambitious, moving between high abstraction and minute
detail, and is frequently insightful. Ultimately, however, Stein fails to persuade.
His vision contains major structural £aws. He delimits the domain of evidence
law too narrowly, and frames the objectives of evidence law awkwardly. His treat-
ment of related rules of evidence, such as standards of proof, appears ad hoc and
inconsistent. More importantly, his understanding of the nature of inference, as
revealed by his discussion of evidential weight and resilience, is seriously £awed.
Ultimately, rather than making a persuasive case against free proof, Stein may
have increased its attraction. Foundations provides a telling demonstration of the
di⁄culty of bringing coherence to evidence law. Discretion being the better part
of valour, this is an area fromwhich the law may continue to remove itself.
nSenior Lecturer,TCBeirne School of Law,University of Queensland. I amgrateful for the comments
of the anonymous reviewer.
1 And, less commonly and more problematically, future and hypothetical events: A. Stein, Founda-
tions of Evidence Law (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2005) 34 (hereinafter referred to as Stein);
D. Hamer ‘‘‘Chance would be a ¢ne thing’’: Proof of causation and quantum in an unpredictable
world’ (1999) 23 MelbULR 557.
2 For Stein’s bibliography, see http://www.professoralexstein.com/pages/2/index.htm (last visited 8
June 2006).
3 Stein 110,138.
4 ibid xii, 110,139.
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THE EVIDENTIALDOMAIN
Stein’s ¢rst misjudgement is in the over-narrowdemarcation of his topic. He lim-
its the domain of evidence law to rules which he views as ‘genuinely evidential’5 ^
those serving the objectives of factual accuracy, e⁄ciency and risk-apportion-
ment.6 He excludes rules which ‘promote objectives extraneous to fact-¢nding’,7
even those whose ‘design and operation are evidence-related’.8 But any rule with
an evidential operationwill inevitably impact upon the operation of fact-¢nding
and should be considered genuinely evidential. And many rules serve both evi-
dential and extraneous objectives, defeating Stein’s dichotomy. Both points argue
for a less procrustean and more inclusive notion of the evidence law. Preferable is
the approach of Weinsteinwho includes as an objective of evidence law,‘support-
ing independent social policies’.9
Many principles in the evidential heartland re£ect concerns extraneous to fact-
¢nding.The hearsay rule, for example, may be justi¢ed by reference to the factual
accuracy goal. An out-of-court statement is viewed as untrustworthy as its maker
has not taken the oath and is not available for cross-examination. Hearsay state-
ments may exceptionally be admitted where accompanied by ‘indicia of reliabil-
ity’ or ‘circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness’.10 For example, because
businesses and their customers constantly rely upon the accuracy of business
records, courts may also consider them reliable.11 But the hearsay rule is not only
concerned with factual accuracy. AsWeinstein points out, ‘some of its vitality is
due to its psychic value to litigants, who feel that those giving evidence against
them should do it publicly and face to face’.12 In theUnited States, the hearsay rule
is identi¢ed with the accused’s constitutional right of confrontation, whichTribe
describes as an‘a⁄rmation of respect for the accused as a human being’.13
The ‘similar fact’ rule, excluding evidence of the defendant’s other misconduct,
serves all three of Stein’s genuinely evidential goals.The fact-¢ndermayover-esti-
mate the value of the evidence, diminishing factual accuracy.14 The evidence may
cause the fact-¢nder to not give the defendant the bene¢t of a reasonable doubt,
and apportion the risk of error illegitimately.15 Finally, other misconduct evidence
can diminish the e⁄ciency of proceedings by proliferating issues,16 surprising the
5 ibid x.
6 n 58 below.
7 Stein 26. Given this it is not clear why heworks so hard to demonstrate that ‘there is no such thing
as a free-standing rule of evidence, unassociated with any of the law’s three fact-¢nding objec-
tives’: at 11^12, and see at 31^33.This is an immediate corollary of his de¢nition of evidence law.
8 ibid 27.
9 J.Weinstein,‘Some di⁄culties in devising rules for determining truth in judicial trials’ (1966) 66
Columbia LR 223, 241.
10 Stein 156. Stein appears to endorse the conventional rationale at this point, but he later sets up a
competing theory, at 227^234.
11 eg Albrighton v Royal PrinceAlfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542, 548^549.
12 Weinstein, n 9 above, 245, and see R. Friedman,‘In¢nite strands, in¢nitesimally thin: Storytell-
ing, Bayesianism, hearsay and other evidence’ (1992) 14 Cardozo LR 79, 99^100.
13 L.Tribe, ‘Trial by mathematics: Precision and ritual in the legal process’ (1971) 84 Harv LR 1329,
1392; see eg Pointer vTexas 380 US 400 (1965).
14 egDPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421, 456; Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 478, 488.
15 eg R. Lempert (1977) ‘Modelling Relevance’ (1977) 75 Mich LR1021 at 1034.
16 eg Perry (1982) 150 CLR 591, 586.
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defendant,17 and confusing the fact-¢nder.18 The exclusion also serves extraneous
objectives. To allow a defendant’s prior o¡ences to be used against him appears
contrary to the notion of rehabilitation and human autonomy.19 And use of prior
o¡ences could be self-ful¢lling ^ the more the police focus on known o¡enders,
the more di⁄cult it is for them to rejoin mainstream society, leading to the crea-
tion of ‘an underclass of ‘‘usual suspects’’.’20
Stein places both exclusionary rules within the domain of evidence law. He
suggests that the rights they provide ‘ultimately derive from epistemic fallibility,
not from moral virtuousness’.21 In support of this claim he suggests that, if fact-
¢nders were infallible, there would be no room for ‘evidential rights that are valu-
able intrinsically, rather than instrumentally’.22 Epistemic fallibility is an inherent
feature of our existence, so Stein’s argument is of dubious value. But there could
be room for these principles in a factually certainworld.The defendantmight still
demand the right to confront his accusers as to the moral basis of their claims.
And the defendant could still argue, for example on sentencing, that he should
be judged on the basis of his present actions without reference to past misdeeds.
But Stein is correct in suggesting that hearsay and similar fact rules do not
operatewithout regard for their costs.Theydo not provide‘free-standing’rights.23
‘In law, balancing and trade-o¡s are unavoidable.’24While these exclusionary rules
may be partly justi¢ed by reference to the defendant’s moral rights, they often
serve fact-¢nding goals at the same time. And where the moral goal and the
fact-¢nding goal are in con£ict, the former may give way. Evidence may be
brought within an exception to the exclusionary rule so as not to in£ict too great
a cost on fact-¢nding.The most damning evidence of a defendant’s past miscon-
duct will get past the similar fact rule if it is su⁄ciently probative.25
Stein’s ‘anti-deontological point’26 draws the hearsay and prior misconduct
rules clearly within the evidential domain despite their moral content. But it also
throws doubt on Stein’s attempt to exclude rules that serve extraneous objectives
through an evidential instrumentality. Given their inevitable impact upon fact-
¢nding objectives, they should be drawn ¢rmly within the evidential domain.
An examination of two of Stein’s examples will demonstrate the impossibility of
his position.
A child, born to a mother living with her husband, is presumed to be legiti-
mate.27 According to Stein, this is a ‘substantive rule of family law’, rather than a
part of the lawof evidence, because it ‘protects the stability of the family. . . at the
17 eg RvMakin (1983) 14 NSWR1, 39^40; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 97(1)(a) and 98(1)(a).
18 eg Z. Cowen and P. Carter, Essays in the Law of Evidence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956) 145.
19 eg A. Zuckerman, Principles of Criminal Evidence (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1989) 232; Stein 32.
20 D.T.Wasserman, ‘The morality of statistical proof and the risk of mistaken liability’ (1991) 13
Cardozo LR 935, 953.
21 Stein 33.
22 ibid 33.
23 ibid 32^33; see also above n 7. This discussion £ows on from his discussion of the evidential
domain, although I found the connection between the two a little obscure.
24 Stein 32.
25 eg the abduction and sexual assault of a child in Pfennig n 14 above.
26 Stein 31.
27 J. Bray, ‘The Increasing Vulnerability of the Presumption of Legitimacy’, in E. Campbell and
L.Waller (eds),Well andTrulyTried: Essays on Evidence (Sydney: Law Book Company,1982) 10.
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expense of accuracy in fact-¢nding.’28 But in most of its manifestations, the pre-
sumption has not beenwholly indi¡erent to factual accuracy. As Stein points out,
the presumption ‘favours erroneous decisions upholding the child’s legitimacy
over erroneous decisions that hold the child illegitimate’.29 The degree of prefer-
ence has varied over time and between jurisdictions, depending upon policy pre-
ferences. At common law the presumption of legitimacy had to be rebutted
beyond reasonable doubt.30 Under legislation in certain jurisdictions, the pre-
sumption of legitimacy was made irrebuttable.31 In this form, exceptionally, the
presumptionwas purely substantive,32 showing no regard to contrary evidence or
objective reality.33 More recently, however, as the social and legal stigma of illegi-
timacy has waned, the objective facts have been given greater weight, and legisla-
tion has made the presumption rebuttable on the balance of probabilities.34
Contrary to Stein’s categorization, the presumption of legitimacy, except in its
irrebuttable form, is concerned with fact-¢nding objectives and should not be
excluded from the evidential domain.35
Also non-evidential, according to Stein, are rules excluding evidence that has
been obtained unlawfully.36 Again Stein suggests that such exclusionary rules ‘are
properly classi¢ed as extraneous to fact-¢nding’37 since they ‘override accuracy in
fact-¢nding for the sake of other objectives and values’,38 namely ‘the integrity of
the criminal justice system and the acceptability of criminal verdicts’.39 But it is
doubtful whether these principles can be so neatly pigeonholed. Some of their
value may derive from doubts that arise about the reliability of evidence that has
been unlawfully obtained,40 for example, such as involuntary confessions. Even
where the reliability of improperly obtained evidence is con¢rmed ^ the murder
28 Stein 27, citingMichael H vGerald D 491US110 (1989),119^121,124^32.
29 Stein 152.
30 Cocks vJuncken (1947) 74 CLR 277, 293^308 (Dixon J);Morris vDavies (1837) 5 Cl & Fin163, 275; 7
ER 365, 404.
31 eg, Children (Equality of Status) Act 1976 (NSW), s 10(1), cited by P. Byrne and J. D. Heydon,
Cross on Evidence (Sydney: Butterworths, 3rd Australian ed,1986) 221.
32 K. Broun, ‘The Unful¢llable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions’ (1984) 62 North
Carolina LR 697, 700; L. Cohen,‘Presumptions According to Purpose: A Functional Approach’
(1981) 45 Albany LR1079,1083.
33 E. Landowski, ‘Truth andVeridiction in Law’ (1989) II International Journal for the Semiotics of Law
(1989), 29, 35^36;MacCormick v Federal Commissioner ofTaxation (1984) 158 CLR 622, 646.
The irrebuttable presumptionwould arguably still giveway to the presumption of innocence. For
example, if a defendant charged with incest was seeking to prove that the complainant, although
born to the defendant’s wife, was illegitimate, the lawwould require him to do nomore than raise
a reasonable doubt. N. Bridge,‘Presumptions and Burdens’ (1949) 12 MLR 273^284; Zuckerman
n 19 above,116.
34 eg Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW), ss 9, 15; Family Law Reform Act 1969, s 26; Serio v Serio
(1983) 4 FLR 756, discussed in M. Redmayne ‘Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation’ (1999) 62
MLR167,180.
35 Although, for practical purposes it may bemore sensible to deal with the variety of presumptions
in the relevant substantive law textbooks rather than in an evidence law text: Byrne and Heydon,
n 31 above,167; J. D. Heydon, Cross on Evidence (Sydney: LexisNexis, 7th Australian ed, 2004) 285.
36 Stein 110.
37 ibid 26.
38 ibid110.
39 ibid 26.
40 eg PACE, s 76(2); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 85.
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weapon is found where stated in the defendant’s confession41 ^ the application of
the exclusionary rule should not be considered to lie outside the evidential
domain. Impacting upon the operation of the rule will be the question whether
procedural integrity ‘can be served by means less corrosive of the judicial system’s
ability to ascertain the truth.’42
UnderAustralia’s uniform evidence law, the trial judge has a discretion to admit
improperly and illegally obtained evidence.43 A factor in£uencing this decision is
probative value,44 since ‘exclusion of an item of evidence is more likely to endan-
ger accurate fact ¢nding if the evidence is highly probative than if it is of minimal
relevance’.45 In theUnited States, the exclusionary rules have Constitutional force
and operate far more stringently.46 But concern has been expressed about freeing
guilty defendants,47 and exceptions have been created.Where the illegality is of a
minor kind, for example an inadvertent technical defect in awarrant, the‘substan-
tial social costs’48 of the exclusionary rulemay be considered too high.The impact
of the exclusionary rule on factually accurate convictions is a live issue even in the
United States, and the rule should be viewed as lying within the evidential
domain.
Stein ill-advisedly narrows the evidential domain in one direction. But he sen-
sibly extends it in another direction, to include rules that, although substantive in
form, serve fact-¢nding objectives.49 He suggests, for example, that the objective
mental element of the provocation defence is substantively problematic,50 and
should be understood as evidential. It addresses the supposed ease of concocting
a subjective mental state,51 the risk that the defence would be misused, and resul-
tant increases in costs of error and error avoidance. Given these objectives, Stein
places the rule in ‘the domain of evidence law, not in the criminal law domain. It
advances evidential objectives rather than the goals of the substantive criminal
law, such as deterrence, desert, and retribution.’52 But again, Stein’s approach is
too strictly dichotomous.
The importation of objective mental states into the criminal law has certainly
been in£uenced by proof di⁄culties.The di⁄culty of mounting successful prose-
cutions for sexual assault has become one of the most pressing issues in criminal
justice. One response has been to make the defence of mistake objective ^ the
41 eg RvWray (1970) 11DLR (3d) 673.
42 Weinstein n 9 above, 228.
43 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 138(1).
44 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 138(3)(a).
45 Evidence (Interim) (Australian Law Reform Commission 26, 1985), vol 1, [964]; quoted in
S. Odgers,Uniform Evidence Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 6th ed, 2004) [1.3.15140].
46 4th and 5th Amendments;Weeks vUS 232US 383 (1914), 393; Silverthorne LumberCovUnited States
251US 385 (1920), 392 .
47 Bivens v Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 US 388 (1971), 416.
48 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984), 907.
49 Stein 3.
50 ibid 4.
51 It may be questioned howdi⁄cult it really is for the prosecution to prove a subjectivemental state.
Mens rea is traditionally viewed an essential element to be proved by the prosecution to the usual
criminal standard of proof: Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 at [35]; Edwards [1975] 1QB 27 (Lawton LJ);
G.Williams, Criminal Law,The General Part (London: Stevens, 2nd ed,1961) 903.
52 Stein 4.
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defendant’s mistaken belief in the complainant’s consent must be honest and
reasonable53 ^ a signi¢cant retreat from the strong subjectivism ofDPP vMorgan.54
But such reforms do not stem solely from perceived proof di⁄culties. They are
also motivated by the substantive view that, in some situations at least, a failure to
meet a reasonable standard of behaviour is criminal.55 Consider Arbour J’s concern
about a mistake defence in a sexual assault case being based ‘exclusively on . . .
unacceptable myths and stereotypes’56 ^ ‘for example . . . on [the defendant’s]
prior belief that the complainant certainly would consent to sexual relations with
him, or on the complainant’s passivity or lack of resistance or, worse, on his con-
ception that ‘‘no means yes’’, or that the complainant is in fact consenting in her
own mind even though she is expressing lack of consent.’57
Stein raises some interesting issues about the scope of evidence law. However,
he de¢nes evidence law too narrowly and seeks to draw too sharp a distinction
between the evidential and the non-evidential. Consequently he risks missing
crucial interactions between fact-¢nding, its context and the substantive law that
it serves.
FACT-FINDING OBJECTIVES
As well as delimiting the evidential domain, Stein’s fact-¢nding objectives are
central to his larger argument against free proof. However, Stein’s objectives and
his vision of how evidence law pursues them are problematic. This weakens his
defence of evidence law against its free proof critics.
Stein’s objectives are: ‘(1) enhancement of accuracy in fact-¢nding . . .; (2) mini-
mization of the expenses that fact-¢nding procedures and decisions incur; and (3)
apportionment of the risk of error . . . between the parties to litigation’.58 It is
instructive to compare themwithWeinstein’s ‘variety of ends served by our rules
of evidence’: 59 ‘Among the goals ^ in addition to truth ¢nding ^ . . . are econo-
mizing of resources, inspiring con¢dence, supporting independent social policies,
permitting ease in prediction and application, adding to the e⁄ciency of the
entire legal system, and tranquilizing disputants.’ By comparison with those of
Weinstein, Stein’s objectives are few, abstract and potentially overlapping. As will
be seen later, these features give rise to some of the di⁄culties with Stein’s theory.
53 Sexual O¡ences Act 2003, s 1(c); Home O⁄ce, Protecting the Public Cm 5668 (2002), 9, 17; see also
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Sexual O¡ences: Final Report (2004), 413^415.
54 [1976] AC182.
55 M.Weinberg,‘Moral Blameworthiness ^ The‘‘objective test’’ dilemma’ (2003) 24 Aust BarRev173,
175; O.W. Holmes,The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1881) 49^51; consider also the
‘rise and fall of inadvertent recklessness’: Dori Kimel,‘Inadvertent Recklessness in Criminal Law’
(2004) 120 LQR 548, 554, a case-note onRvG [2004] 1AC1034; and the growing body of litera-
ture questioning any attempt to sharply distinguish subjective and objective mental states:
A. Candeub, ‘Consciousness and Culpability’ (2002) 54 Alabama LR 113; K. Ferzan, ‘Opaque
Recklessness’ (2001) 91 Journal of Criminal Lawand Criminology 597.
56 RvCinous [2002] 2 SCR 3 [167]; see alsoVictorian LawReformCommission n 53 above, 409^413.
57 Rv Cinous [2002] 2 SCR 3 [167].
58 Stein 1.
59 Weinstein n 9 above, 241; quoted in Stein 36.
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Stein and Weinstein both mention the factual accuracy goal ¢rst.Weinstein
expressly identi¢es ‘truth ¢nding’ as the ‘central purpose’,60 noting that ‘[u]nless
reasonably accurate fact ¢nding is assumed, there does not appear to be any sound
basis for our judicial system.’61 Stein similarly observes that ‘[g]etting the facts
right is a prerequisite to proper determination of the litigated entitlements and
liabilities.’62 Weinstein recognises that factual accuracy is a matter of assumption.
As Stein points out, there is no way to de¢nitively establish the correspondence
between the facts as found and what actually occurred.63 It is the di⁄culty of
proving actuality that evidence law is designed to address. Stein rejects scepticism
in favour of the more straightforward ‘common-sense view’ that humans have a
‘well-integrated reasoning apparatus’;64 although, elsewhere his commitment to
the rationality of the enterprise waivers. And Stein displays awillingness to sacri-
¢ce factual accuracy in order to achieve other goals.
Weinstein and Stein both recognise e⁄ciency as a goal of evidence law. How-
ever, their conceptualizations of e⁄ciency di¡er signi¢cantly. For Weisenstein,
e⁄ciency means minimizing the resources expended on litigation, particularly
time and money. He recognises that this imperative may clash with the desire for
factual accuracy: ‘The hardest and most important job of a procedural system is to
keep striking awise balance throughout the various points of con£ict.’65 Stein has
a far broader notion of e⁄ciency. The costs to be minimised include the cost of
error as well as the cost of error-avoidance.66 And the cost of error is not limited
to the immediate damage to the losing party as a result of the error,67 but extends
to social bene¢ts such as deterrence and corrective justice.68 Thus Stein’s notion
of e⁄ciency incorporates many of the other goals speci¢cally mentioned by
Weinstein.
The breadth of Stein’s conception of e⁄ciency raises a concern. Although listed
separately, factual accuracy, for Stein, is also a component of e⁄ciency ^ a gain in
factual accuracy is a reduction in the cost of error.This creates the risk that factual
accuracy may be devalued; it may be sacri¢ced too readily for broader e⁄ciency
gains. Consider Stein’s justi¢cation of the corroboration requirement in ‘word
against word’ civil cases.69 Stein suggests this requirement is a‘decisional shortcut’
with a ‘sound economic rationale’.70 ‘The number of . . . cases in which the fact-
¢nders can justi¢ably assess the claimant’s testimony as more probable than not is
relatively small. Expending adjudication costs on the entire pool of ‘‘word
against word’’ cases in order to identify these outliers is therefore economically
60 Weinstein n 9 above, 243; see also Zuckerman n 19 above, 7; J. Koehler and D. Shaviro,‘Veridical
Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy through the use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and
Methods’ (1990) 75 Cornell LR 247, 250; W. Twining, ‘Rationality and scepticism in judicial
proof: some signposts’ (1989) II InternationalJournal for the Semiotics of Law 69, 72.
61 Weinstein n 9 above, 243(emphasis added).
62 Stein 10.
63 ibid 56.
64 ibid 57.
65 Weinstein n 9 above, 241; quoting from James,Civil Procedure 2 (Boston: Little Brown,1965).
66 Stein 141.
67 eg ibid144^146.
68 eg ibid 142,148.
69 See authorities cited at ibid 242, fn 103.
70 ibid 137.
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imprudent.’71 Stein provides no empirical support for his statement that few
uncorroborated claimants would be found su⁄ciently credible to succeed, and
this may be questioned. Of more concern, however, is his suggestion that the
court should consider such claimants ‘outliers’, avoid the cost of identifying them
and disregard their just claims.
Stein’s reasoning would have greater application to‘word against word’ criminal
cases. Given that the criminal standard is higher than the civil standard, there
would presumably be even fewer cases where the complainant’s uncorroborated
testimony would have su⁄cient strength.72 Sexual assault cases, for example,
frequently turn into a credibility battle between complainant and defendant, par-
ticularly where there is no forensic evidence or consent is in issue. In many juris-
dictions the law has required that a warning be given of the dangers of relying on
uncorroborated complainant testimony. However, these requirements have
increasingly been abolished.73 One might have thought that Stein would argue
for strengthened corroboration requirements, on economic grounds. Instead he
endorses Roberts and Zuckerman’s view that the requirements ‘re£ected sexist
stereotyping of ^ predominantly, female ^ sexual assault complainants, rather than
well-founded assessments of complainants’ testimonial unreliability’.74 Stein fails
to reconcile this with his view of ‘word against word’ civil cases.
Stein’s third and ¢nal fact-¢nding objective, apportionment of the risk of error,
bears no resemblance to any of Weinstein’s goals. Stein’s objective is extremely
broad in two dimensions. First, according to Stein, the pursuit of this objective
is ubiquitous; ‘evidential rules and principles . . . have a single all-important func-
tion: allocation of the risk of error’.75 Second, this allocation may be made on
utilitarian or deontological grounds,76 in order to maximise e⁄ciency, or to
achieve fairness at the expense of e⁄ciency.This is not a necessary opposition ^ a
utilitarian apportionment may also be fair.77 But the question can arise whether,
in apportioning risk, individual rights should be allowed to trump utility.78
Stein considers risk-apportionment as the ‘fundamental’79 and ‘key function’80 of
evidence law. This forms a major plank in Stein’s case against free proof. Stein
accepts the ‘epistemic con¢dence doctrine’,81 according to which regulation of
empirical inquiry is unnecessary and ill-advised. But this is insu⁄cient to invalidate
71 ibid (emphasis in original).
72 JeremyGans,‘‘‘Whomdoyoubelieve?’’Criminal Appeals, Con£ictingTestimonyand the Burden
of Proof ’ (2000) 22 Syd LR 220.
73 Scots law still requires corroboration:McNairnvHMAdvocate [2005] HCJAC112; 2005 SLT1071.
This is currently under review: Scottish Law Commission,Rape andOther Sexual O¡encesDP131
(2006), [7.26].
74 Stein 25, fn 76, discussing Carmell vTexas 529 US 513 (2000), quoting from P. Roberts and
A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 479; see also Longman
(1989) 168 CLR 79, 85^86.
75 Stein 138.
76 ibid 2.
77 ibid 214.
78 ibid 2, 17; Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’, in JeremyWaldron (ed),Theories of Rights (1984),
153.
79 Stein xi.
80 ibid x.
81 ibid113.
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evidence law.‘‘‘[N]atural fact-¢nding’’ ideas could . . . only be plausible if adjudi-
cative fact-¢nding were ‘‘natural’’ in some unadulterated epistemological sense.
But it is not. . . . [V]alue-preferences ^ or, more precisely, preferences with respect
to the allocation of the risk of error ^ permeate adjudicative fact-¢nding.’82 And
the prevalent ‘moral scepticism’ indicates that ‘[e]nforceable value-preferences can
only be formed by social consensus mechanisms, such as law’.83 Stein’s argument
against free proof is sophisticated and complex, and there is insu⁄cient space to
examine it fully here. Here I focus on Stein’s claim that risk allocation is ‘a perva-
sive phenomenon’,84 which fact-¢nders carry out ‘not only in their ultimate ¢nd-
ings ^ as they ought to under the applicable burdens and standards of proof ^ but
also in selecting evidence (through admission and exclusion mechanisms) and in
relying upon particular evidence as a basis for their ¢ndings’.85
Before assessing Stein’s claim, his meaning should be clari¢ed. On one level,
Stein makes a point which is both inarguable and insightful. A decision on the
admissibility of evidence may be wrong, just as the fact-¢nder’s ultimate decision
may be wrong. Exclusionary rules have the e¡ect of allocating the risk of error
just as burdens and standards of proof allocate the risk of error. To this extent,
Stein’s point cannot be denied. But Stein makes a far stronger claim. According
to Stein, risk-apportionment is not only an inevitable by-product of the operation
of exclusionary rules. Risk-apportionment is ‘the key function’;86 it is a principle
of design.This claim is far more di⁄cult to maintain.
To evaluate Stein’s claim it is helpful to ¢rst consider the conventional risk-allo-
cation rationale for the criminal standard of proof.The application of the criminal
standard determines the ultimate issue ^ whether the defendant is convicted or
acquitted. There are two possible erroneous outcomes ^ wrongful conviction
(false positive) and mistaken acquittal (false negative). The former is viewed far
more seriously than the latter.87 Setting the criminal standard at a high level
favours the defendant over the prosecution. It reduces the risk of the worse error,
although at the same time it increases the risk of the less harmful error and the
overall expected error rate.88
Compare this with Stein’s risk-allocation analysis of a rule restricting the
admission of evidence impeaching the criminal defendant.
[B]road admission of prior-conviction might excessively intensify the fact-¢nder’s
distrust of criminal defendants as witnesses. Suppression of such evidence, however,
82 ibid113.
83 ibid 112.
84 ibid 64.
85 ibid 64. This claim, if correct, would defeat Stein’s use of fact-¢nding objectives to constrain the
evidential domain. He suggests, eg, that the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence lies outside
the evidential domain because it serves an objective ‘extraneous to fact-¢nding’: at 26, 110. But
why would the rule not fall within the risk-apportionment objective? The exclusion would
apportion the risk against the state, whose o⁄cers had acted illegally in obtaining the evidence,
and in favour of the defendant, whose rights had thus been infringed.
86 ibid x (emphasis added).
87 ReWinship 397 US 358 (1970);Van derMeer (1988) 82 ALR10, 31.
88 D. Hamer ‘Probabilistic standards of proof, their complements and the errors that are expected to
£ow fromthem’ (2004) 1Universityof NewEngland LJ 71,87^96; http://tlc.une.edu.au/lawjournal/
pdf/UNELJ_1^1_Hamer.pdf (last visited 29 Sept 2006).
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can also produce fact-¢nding errors. Unaware of the defendant’s criminal past, the
fact-¢nders may credit his or her testimony with greater credibility than it deserves.
Both types of error would distort the ultimate probabilities of guilt and innocence.
Because false positives and false negatives do not in£ict similar harms, the distortions
that are likely to occur do not cancel each other out.There is, therefore, a sound uti-
litarian reason for excluding evidence that reveals the defendant’s criminal record.89
Here, the risk-allocation reasoning is strained. Unlike the standard of proof, the
exclusionary rule does not have a direct impact on the outcome of the case. The
immediate error will be either mistaken exclusion, with the consequence that the
fact-¢nder gives the defendant toomuch credibility, or mistaken admission, with
the defendant being given too little credibility. But, at this stage, no binding deci-
sion is made, and the cost of error cannot be brought to account. Stein notes that
erroneous exclusion or admissionwould ‘distort the ultimate probabilities of guilt
and innocence’,90 and talks in terms of the relative costs of ultimate errors ^ false
positives and false negatives. Erroneous admission might bring about awrongful
conviction. But it is misleading to equate the two. Awrongful conviction might
have occurred in any event. And there are other possibilities. The erroneous
admission of impeachment evidencemay bring about or happen to coincide with
a correct conviction. And despite erroneous admission, there may be a correct or
erroneous acquittal. A similar set of outcomes can be associated with the erro-
neous exclusion of impeachment evidence. The uncertain impact of erroneous
application makes it di⁄cult to view the exclusionary rule as an exercise in risk-
allocation. The motivations for the rule are more likely to be along the lines of
those for the related similar fact rule discussed above ^ a concern that the prejudi-
cial evidence will be misused by the fact-¢nder, interfering with the pursuit of
factual accuracy, the proper operation of the criminal standard of proof, and the
policy goal of rehabilitation.
Stein provides a novel and interesting view of the objectives of fact-¢nding.
However, its normative or descriptive superiority to the orthodox view is not
established. Despite his arguments to the contrary, factual accuracy should be
recognised as the paramount concern of evidence law and should not lightly be
sacri¢ced for the sake of economic e⁄ciency. And although the risk of error is a
pervasive phenomenon, there is no call for viewing risk-allocation as the ‘princi-
pal objective of evidence law’.91Stein fails tomake out his defence of evidence law
against the free proof movement.
QUANTITATIVE STANDARDSOF PROOF
So far I have examined Stein’s theory at the macro level ^ his view of the domain
of evidence law and its de¢ning objectives. I now consider a set of Stein’s more
detailed analyses ^ those relating to standards of proof. These principles govern
the fact-¢nder’s ultimate decisions, apportioning the riskof error between the par-
89 Stein 16, but see his argument favouring the ready admission of this evidence at 164^165.
90 ibid 16.
91 ibid133.
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ties. Many commentators have used decision theory to model the risk-apportion-
ment process, prescribing probabilistic standards of proof at which the expected
harm of erroneous decisions is minimised.92 At times Stein appears to approve of
this utilitarian approach, but at other times he rejects it without adequate explana-
tion. Stein’s theory of standards of proof appears incoherent and inconsistent,
which undermines his criticism of those who would describe evidence law as
‘largely ununi¢ed and scattered, existing for disparate and sometimes con£icting
reasons’.93
The decision-theory model of standards of proof is simple and powerful. Sup-
pose that the harm of an erroneous ¢nding of liability is L, and the harm of an
erroneous rejection of liability is R. If liability is proven to probability level p,
then the expected harm from a ¢nding of liability is:94
ð1 pÞ  L
That is, the probability that the ¢nding of liability is wrong (the complement
of the probability of liability), multiplied by the harm of a wrong ¢nding of lia-
bility. Similarly, the expected harm from a rejection of liability is:
p :R
To minimise the expected harm of a decision, liability should be found when
this would generate less expected harm than rejecting liability; that is, when the
¢rst quantity noted above is less than the second quantity noted above.This will
occur when,
p > L=ðRþ LÞ
When the probability lies below this value, no ¢nding of liability should be
made.
Stein uses this model to contrast the civil and criminal standards of proof.95
[T]he P40.5 rule should apply . . . when false positives and false negatives are
equally harmful, which normally is the case in civil litigation.When one type of
error is more harmful than the other, fact-¢nders should follow a di¡erent rule. In
criminal adjudication, for example, false positives (wrongful convictions) are gen-
erally considered more harmful than false negatives (wrongful acquittals). . . .
[W]hen the disutility di¡erential [L/R] equals 9/1 (convicting an innocent is nine
92 J. Kaplan, ‘Decision Theory and the Fact¢nding Process’ (1968), 20 Stanford LR 1065; M. L.
DeKay, ‘The Di¡erence between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of
Proof ’ (1996) 21Lawand Social Inquiry 95; Hamer, above n 88. Nance described this as the ‘conven-
tional’model of standards of proof: DNance,‘Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof ’
(1998) 49 Hastings LJ 621, 622.
93 Stein110, quoting fromJ.D.Heydon, Evidence:Cases andMaterials (London: Butterworths, 2nd ed,
1984) 3.
94 Terminology varies. A distinction could be drawn between the expected utility of correct deci-
sions and the expected disutility of incorrect decisions. However, these two measures can be
reduced into a simpler notion of ‘cost’ of error: DeKay n 92 above,99^100. Conventions formath-
ematical notation also vary, but Stein unhelpfully adopts inconsistent approaches at di¡erent
places in the book: 15,149,172. Here I use lower-case italic to indicate that the probability of liabi-
lity, p, varies between di¡erent cases, and upper-case roman to indicate that the harms of error,
L and R, are (assumed to be) constant for a given class of case.
95 Stein 14^16.
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times more harmful than acquitting a guilty criminal), adjudicators should convict
the accused if the probability of his or her guilt is greater than 0.9.96
Stein applies the model more broadly. As mentioned above he explains the pre-
sumption of legitimacy in these terms.97 Given that a mistaken ¢nding that a
child is illegitimate (L) is more harmful than a mistaken ¢nding of legitimacy
(R), a high standard of proof is imposed on the party seeking to prove illegiti-
macy. Similar reasoning applies in those serious civil cases where the defendant’s
liberty is at stake, through committal to amental institution, deportation or dena-
turalization. To mistakenly deprive a person of her liberty is ‘considerably more
harmful’ than to mistakenly continue her liberty.98 The risks of error are ‘mani-
festly asymmetrical’, and a higher standard of proof is imposed on the party that
would deprive the other of her liberty.99
But Stein rejects this explanation for a higher standard in civil cases involving
criminal allegations such as fraud. Stein acknowledges that the defendant has more
at stake than in a typical civil action ^ ‘[i]denti¢ed as fraudulent, the person su¡ers
a reputation loss’.100 However, he suggests the higher standard is not to be
explained by decision theory: ‘This . . . does not aim at attaining the socially desir-
able ratio of false positives versus false negatives’.101 Instead he argues that the higher
standard attenuates overdeterrence.102 Regardless of the value of this explanation ^
which is not necessarily inconsistent with the decision-theory approach ^ Stein’s
reasoning appears inconsistent. He fails to explain why the decision-theory ana-
lysis is applicable to serious civil cases involving a ¢nding of illegitimacy and loss
of liberty, but not serious civil cases involving allegations of criminal conduct.
Stein also expresses ambivalence about the application of decision-theory ana-
lysis to the criminal standard of proof. As noted above, at one point he uses deci-
sion theory to contrast it with the civil standard. At other points he strongly
advocates the utilitarian approach to proof of crime.‘In law, balancing and trade-
o¡s are unavoidable’.103 The rights claimed by a criminal defendant could
‘seriously dilute deterrence’.104 ‘More innocent victims . . . would . . . become
exposed to and, inevitably, su¡er from crime.’105 Consideration of the harm to
victims from erroneous acquittals throws doubt on the notion that a wrongful
96 ibid 149.
97 n 29 above.
98 Stein 153.
99 In the United States, a third intermediate standard is imposed, requiring ‘clear and convincing
evidence’. In England and Australia, it is said that the ordinary civil standard applies, but its
requirements take account of ‘the gravity of the consequences £owing from a particular ¢nding’:
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361^362. Another consideration mentioned by Dixon
J in Briginshaw is the ‘inherent unlikelihood’ of more serious allegations, which may provide an
alternative explanation for more stringent proof requirements: Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan
Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449, 450; ReH [1996] AC 563, 586; see generally Redmayne n 34
above.
100 Stein 153.
101 ibid.
102 ibid, citing his articleR. Bierschbach andA. Stein,‘Overenforcement’ (2005) 93GeorgetownLJ1743.
103 Stein 31.
104 ibid.
105 ibid, see also at 173^174.
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conviction constitutes a ‘special moral injustice’.106 But then Stein does an about-
face, favours deontology over utilitarianism, and endorses a ‘next-to-certainty’107
standard, which cannot be represented by any point on the probability scale
‘except for the unrealistic 1’.108 A standard set at any lower probability level would
suggest that wrongful convictions were tolerable. Suppose, for example, the stan-
dard were set at 0.9, and in 20 cases guilt is proven to 0.95, all resulting in convic-
tions.The expectation is that one these convictions was wrongful.That defendant
would be entitled to ask,‘Why should I be sacri¢ced?Whyme?’109 Stein does not
just empathise with the law’s squeamishness about the inevitability of mistaken
convictions.110 He gives the ‘next-to-certainty’ standard his full normative endor-
sement. In Stein’s view, this is the only way that the law can‘treat its citizens with
equal concern and respect’.111 There is insu⁄cient space in this review to explore
Stein’s arguments in full. Here I highlight inconsistencies in his position, and the
unworkability of his near-absolute non-probabilistic standard.
At one point Stein indicates that his criminal standard of proof ‘should apply
indiscriminately across the board’, and that ‘no trade o¡ should be allowed
between these requirements and the severity of the o¡ence on trial’.112 Stein’s
unyielding attitude is contrary to authorities which recognise that the ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’ formulation is inherently £exible.‘Jurymen themselves set the
standard ofwhat is reasonable in the circumstances.’113 ‘[T]here is no absolute stan-
dard . . . theremay be degrees of proofwithin that standard. . . . [I]n proportion as
the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be clear.’114 In a capital case,‘the pro-
spects of the death penaltymay a¡ect [the jurors’] honest judgment of the facts . . .
or what they may deem to be a reasonable doubt’.115 And Stein himself does not
hold the line, recognizing two situations where trade-o¡s lead to a relaxation in
the criminal standard.
The ¢rst concerns criminal defences, such as insanity and diminished respon-
sibility, which merely excuse the defendant’s conduct116 rather than fully justify-
ing it, as with self-defence.The erroneous denial of a justi¢catory defence would
be just as harmful as any other wrongful conviction, and such defences should be
disproved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.117 However, an excusa-
tory defence does not fully exonerate the defendant, and the harm of a mistaken
106 ibid 174.
107 ibid178.
108 ibid 178.
109 Or, as Stein poetically puts it: ‘why I?’: ibid 214.
110 D. Kaye,‘The Laws of Probability and the Laws of the Land’ (1979) 47 UChicago LR 34, 40;Tribe
n13 above,1372; C. Nesson,‘Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences:TheValue of Complex-
ity’ (1979) 92 Harv LR 1187, 1225; but see D. Shaviro, ‘Statistical-Probability Evidence and the
Appearance of Justice’ (1989) 103 Harv LR 530, 544^5.
111 Stein 175.
112 ibid 179.
113 Green (1971) 126 CLR 28, 32.
114 Bater v Bater [1951] P 35, 36^37; endorsed in Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home O⁄ce [1984] AC
74,112^113.
115 Adams vTexas 448 US 38 (1980), 50 (White J). See also R. E. Lillquist, ‘Recasting Reasonable
Doubt: DecisionTheory and theVirtues of Variability’ (2002) 36 UCDavis LR 85.
116 Stein 180^181, also at 149^150.
117 For further discussion of the distinction between excuses and justi¢cations, see eg, G. Fletcher,
‘Two Kinds of Legal Rules: AComparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal
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denial of the defence would not outweigh the harm to law enforcement £owing
from mistakenly allowing the defence. There is a greater symmetry between
errors than is usual in the criminal context, and the defendant should be required
to prove an excusatorydefence on the balance of probabilities.118 Stein approves of
this trade-o¡ and the reduced standard of criminal proof it produces.
Stein also advocates a lower criminal standard of proof for ‘administrative vio-
lations punishable by ¢nes and injunctions alone’.119 He does not elaborate, but
this relaxation of the criminal standard is presumably on the basis that a mistaken
¢nding of ‘quasi-criminal’ liability would be less harmful than for ‘truly criminal’
o¡ences.120 Meanwhile, a failure of law enforcement may severely compromise
public protection. ‘Thalidomide, Bhopal, Chernobyl and the ExxonValdez can
leave no doubt as to the potential human and environmental devastation’121 £ow-
ing from quasi-criminal infringements.This is a second lowering of the criminal
standard that seemingly meets Stein’s approval, despite his ‘no trade-o¡ ’stance.
A further problem for Stein’s near-absolute criminal standard of proof is its
unworkability. ‘In the real world of human actions we can never be absolutely
certain of anything’.122 Of course, Stein appreciates this,123 and his standard of proof
requires not absolute certainty, but ‘next-to-certainty’.124 Although his standard
would not require the fact-¢nder to achieve certainty, Stein is reluctant to concede
that it carries an explicit risk of wrongful conviction. Underlying Stein’s attempt to
have it both ways is a di⁄cult distinction between, as he terms them, Risk I and
Risk II errors. Stein claims that the criminal standard immunises the defendant from
the former but exposes him to the latter.125 The distinction is not quantitative ^ the
size of the risk ^ but qualitative.126 Stein describes this as a‘doctrinal di¡erentiation’127
but then, inconsistently, suggests that courts are ‘reluctant to articulate’ it.128 Stein
himself provides various articulations which are neither consistent nor persuasive.
Stein ¢rst suggests that ‘any perceptible doubt [Risk I] . . . must work in favour
of the accused’ whereas ‘[d]oubts that remain . . . imperceptible [Risk II] . . . do
not pass the threshold of reasonableness’.129 But Stein’s attempt to distinguish his
Cases’ (1968) 77 Yale LJ 880,919. For criticism, see eg E. Colvin,‘ExculpatoryDefences in Criminal
Law’ (1990) 10 OJLS 381, 382, 386^7, 390.
118 egRvJordan [2002]QB1112 holding that a reverse persuasive burden on diminished responsibility
is consistent with the presumption of innocence under the Human Rights Act 1998.
119 Stein 180.
120 eg Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 [154]; Sherras vDeRutzen [1895] 1QB 918, 922, but see A. Stein,‘After
HUNT:The Burden of Proof, Risk of Non-Persuasion and Judicial Pragmatism’ (1991) 54 MLR
570^576, arguing against relaxation of standard of proof for defence to charge of unauthorised
tree-felling.
121 WholesaleTravel Group Inc [1991] 3 SCR154, 250.
122 B. Shapiro, ‘‘‘To a Moral Certainty’’: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries
1600^1850’ (1986) 38 Hastings LJ 153,193; see also ReWinship n 87 above, 370.
123 eg Stein 2, 56.
124 ibid178.
125 ibid173; Zuckerman n 19 above,134^140.
126 Stein 178.
127 ibid174.
128 ibid173, fn 6.
129 ibid173. Stein muddies the water by comparing a conviction in the face of a perceptible doubt to a
‘deliberately erroneous conviction’, at 174. This expression suggests that the fact-¢nder knew that
the defendant was innocent, rather than merely doubting his guilt.
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standard from certainty fails. If a fact-¢nder has a doubt, that is,‘a feeling of uncer-
tainty’,130 then, byde¢nition, the fact-¢nder will have perceived it. If the standard
requires the fact-¢nder to have no perceptible doubt about the defendant’s guilt,
then the standard requires certainty.131But this is too demanding. If it is acknowl-
edged that absolute certainty about real world events is unachievable, doubt will
always be perceptible. There may be occasions where a fact-¢nder unjusti¢ably
feels absolute certainty. But thesewill be rare. A standard of certaintywould result
in too few convictions and a failure of law enforcement.
At another point Stein takes quite a di¡erent tack. He suggests that the criminal
standard ‘immunizes the accused only from the evidentially con¢rmed risk of erro-
neous conviction (Risk I). . . [but] exposes the accused to the riskof erroneous con-
victionwhen the risk lacks evidential con¢rmation (Risk II).’132 This version has the
opposite di⁄culty. Stein does create a standard that clearly lies belowcertainty, but it
appears too far below. To require that there is speci¢c evidence of the defendant’s
innocence for acquittal contravenes the presumption of innocence.133 Stein varies
his expression slightly, describing the distinction as one between ‘evidenced and
case-speci¢c . . . scenarios in which the defendant is innocent’ (Risk I) and ‘abstract
and theoretical . . . scenarios’ (Risk II),134 but the distinction remains problematic.
On this view, for acquittal, there must be a de¢nite and concrete account of the
defendant’s innocence consistent with the evidence. There must be a ‘doubt based
on a reason’135 capable of clear articulation by the fact-¢nder. But to suggest that ‘a
generalized unease or skepticism about the prosecution’s evidence is not avalid basis
to resist entreaties to vote for conviction’136 still infringes the presumption of inno-
cence. It sets the criminal standard of proof too low, and, contrary to Stein’s stated
aim, would provide insu⁄cient protection for the innocent defendant.
Stein provides an example of how his criminal standard would apply to a bank
robbery.The defendant, D, is identi¢ed as a person seen near the bank shortly after
the robberycarrying a sub-machine gun. Fingerprints matchingD are found at the
bank. D’s alibiwitness,W, is thoroughly discredited by a prosecution recording of a
conversation inwhich D promisedW d500,000 for providing false evidence. Stein
recognises that the fact-¢nder may not have absolute certainty ^ ‘Dmay have been
framed by corrupt police o⁄cers . . . it is also possible that his alibi conspiracy with
Wwas, in his mind, his only chance of escaping false conviction’.137 However, he
suggests that D would be convicted. This conclusion is plausible, but it does not
illustrate the application of Stein’s standard. The defence scenarios may be insu⁄-
cient to acquit, but, if the fact-¢nder gave them any consideration, they would
clearly not be imperceptible. Nor is Stein justi¢ed in dismissing these
130 Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd rev ed, 2005) (emphasis added).
131 Stein 174.
132 ibid173.
133 Compare Zuckerman n 19 above,139.
134 Stein 178.
135 T. Mulrine, ‘Reasonable Doubt: How in theWorld is it De¢ned?’ (1997) 12 American University
Journal of International Law and Policy 195, 224; J. Newman,‘Beyond ‘‘Reasonable Doubt’’’ (1993) 68
NYULR 979, 983 at fn 17.
136 Newman, n 135 above, 983.
137 Stein 179.
The truthwill out? Incoherence and scepticism in Foundations of Evidence Law
332
r 2007 The Author. Journal Compilationr 2007 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2007) 70(2) MLR 318^338
scenarios as ‘completely unevidenced [and] theoretical’.138 The defendant may not
be able to point to anycase-speci¢c evidence supporting the scenarios, but this does
not mean they are of no account. Courts are aware that ‘‘‘fabrication of evidence . . .
does occur’’, and at times has even been ‘a routine feature of ‘‘police culture’’’.139
They also appreciate that even the innocent, when under suspicion, have a ‘ten-
dency. . . towish to distance themselves from the persons or events connectedwith
the alleged crimes and to endeavour to improve their position by falsehood’.140 The
di⁄culty with the defence scenarios is not qualitative ^ that they present Risk II
rather than Risk I. The problem for the defendant is quantitative.141 The defence
scenarios simply lack su⁄cient probabilistic strength.
Decision theoryprovides a compellingaccount of how standards of proof are set at
probabilistic levels that minimise the expected cost of error. Stein applies this widely,
though not uniformly, to civil standards.And he balks at aprobabilistic criminal stan-
dard, as it involves an explicit acknowledgement of the risk of wrongful conviction.
But unless the law enforcement goal is abandoned, this risk cannot be avoided, and
decision theory appears the best wayof managing it. Stein fails to establish his quali-
tative near-certainty standard as a viable alternative to the probabilistic standard.
WEIGHTOF EVIDENCE
Stein supports the decision-theory model of probabilistic standards of proof in
some contexts. However, he also argues that the probabilistic measure of proof,
by itself, is inadequate. It is insu⁄cient for a fact-¢nder to assess the probability
level of the version of facts, given the body of evidence. According to Stein, the
probabilistic criterion needs to be supplemented by a second ‘weight’ criterion.142
Stein suggests that the familiar ‘naked statistical evidence’ cases illustrate his
point.143 The plainti¡ in the Blue Bus case,144 having been negligently hit by an
unidenti¢ed bus, brings an action against the Blue Bus Co solely on the basis that
it owns 80 per cent of the buses in town. The probability of the Blue Bus Co’s
liability appears to be 0.80. In the Prisoners in theYard case, 999 of 1000 inmates
participated in the killing of a prison o⁄cer, the other unidenti¢ed inmate
138 ibid.
139 Kelly (2004) 218CLR216, 249^250, quoting fromQueensland,Report ofCommittee of Inquiry into the
Enforcement of Criminal Law inQueensland (1977), [26].
140 Harris (1990) SASR 321, 323.
141 Stein 178.
142 eg ibid 48. Stein relies heavily on L. J. CohenThe Probable and the Provable (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977). However, Cohen presented weight as an alternative inductive measure of probability, not
one that supplements the more familiar mathematical measure.
143 This legal issue has long been recognised: Sargent vMassachusetts Accident Co 307 Mass 246 (1940);
Briginshaw n 99 above, 361^362; J. McBaine, ‘Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief ’ (1944) 32 Calif
LR 242. The issue has also been long discussed by philosophers and psychologists: J. M. Keynes,
ATreatise on Probability (London: Macmillan,1921) Ch 6; C. Hartshorne and P.Weiss (eds),Collected
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, (CambridgeMass: HarvardUniversity Press,1932)Volume 2, Elements
of Logic, 421; D. Ellsburg, ‘Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms’ (1961) 75 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 643; Cohen n 142 above.
144 Stein 78;Tribe n13 above,1340^1341,1346^1350. See alsoA.Tversky andD. Kahneman,‘Evidential
Impact of Base Rates’ in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A.Tversky (eds), Judgement underUncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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playing no role. Every inmate claims to be the non-participant.The probabilityof
each inmate’s guilt appears to be 0.999.145 In both cases, the evidence appears
strong enough in probabilistic terms to satisfy the applicable standard of proof.
However, many commentators assume that the evidence would be insu⁄cient
to establish liability.146 Some, including Stein, suggest that the di⁄culty is that
the evidence lacks su⁄cient weight.147 However, Stein’s description of the weight
concept and its supposed advantages is uneven and unconvincing.
Stein’s strongest argument highlights the non-epistemological bene¢ts of
weight.These have also been appreciated byother commentators. Aproof lacking
weight would be lacking in detail and generalised.Weight, as Stein points out,
‘individualizes adjudicative ¢ndings of fact that attach to an individual event’.148
This is important in a system which is ‘traditionally strongly attached to indivi-
dualized justice and strive[s] to arrive at the just result in the light of concrete cir-
cumstances of the case: Justice . . . can hardly be separated from details’.149 As well
as this moral bene¢t, a detailed concrete proofmay also‘enhance the . . . the power
of the law’s substantive message’.150 These qualities might justify aweight require-
ment, despite its other costs. At times this appears to be Stein’s position.151 But he
primarily advocates the weight criterion on epistemological grounds.
Stein is equivocal in addressing the epistemological nature of weight. He sug-
gests that ‘[e]pistemology cannot decide whether fact-¢nders should base their
adjudicative decisions upon probability estimates that do not carry much
weight.’152 ‘Weighty and non-weighty probabilities are apples and oranges.There
is no common denominator towhich these probabilities can be reduced in order
to be compared against each other.Weighty and non-weighty probabilities are
incommensurable.’153 But, as James Logue comments, to remove weight from
epistemology is ‘a very unhappy shift . . . [H]owever weight or reliability is to be
explained, it is undoubtedly an epistemic concept, and attempts to account for it
or measure it in terms of non-epistemic criteriamust be suspect’.154 And, on other
occasions Stein expounds the epistemic bene¢ts of increasing the weight of evi-
dence: ‘Some determinations of probability are better evidenced and, conse-
quently, weightier than others, and rational fact-¢nders ought to take this factor
into account.’155
145 Stein 78; Nesson n 110 above,1192^3.
146 eg Tribe and Nesson, nn 144,145 above. Some commentators have questioned this assumption:
eg J. Brook ‘The Use of Statistical Evidence of Identi¢cation in Civil Litigation: Well-worn
Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy’ (1985) St Louis ULJ 293, 299.
147 Stein 85; Cohen n 142 above; N. Cohen, ‘Con¢dence in probability: Burdens of persuasion in a
world of imperfect knowledge’ (1985) 60 NYULR 385.
148 Stein 70.
149 M. Damas› ka ‘Presentation of evidence and fact-¢nding precision’ (1975) 123 University of Penn-
sylvania LR1083,1103^1104.
150 C.Nesson,‘The Evidence or the Event?On Judicial Proof and theAcceptability of VerdictsThesis’
(1985) 98 Harv LR1357,1391.
151 Stein 226.
152 ibid133, see also at 84.
153 ibid 84.
154 J. Logue, Projective Probability (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995) 84.
155 Stein 132.
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The epistemic problem which Stein considers the weight criterion to solve is
the ‘unrealized potential of the missing evidence to produce a di¡erent factual
conclusion’.156 Propositions £owing from low weight probabilities are ‘too risky
to rely upon. Decisions relying on such propositions are epistemologically ques-
tionable, if not altogether illegitimate.’157 Stein asserts that weighty probabilities
avoid this risk because they are ‘reliable’, ‘resilient’, ‘invariant’ and ‘robust’,158
‘less likely to be shaken by potential additions to its information base’.159 But
these bene¢ts are merely asserted.They are not demonstrated, and may prove to
be illusory.
Promoters of the resilience concept sometimes invoke the statistical concept of
con¢dence.160 Consider, for example, the probability that the next ball drawn at
random from an urn will be red, assessed from the frequency of red in past
draws.161 Ten draws resulted in ¢ve red balls. Three hundred of 600 draws were
red. Both frequency ¢gures support a probability of 0.5 that the next ball drawn
will be red. But the estimate based upon 600 draws would be far more reliable.
Statistically, the 95 per cent con¢dence interval for ten draws is 0.570.32.162 For
600 draws it is 0.570.04.163 This is a situation in which a greater weight of evi-
dence has measurably increased reliability. But this inference problem is far
removed from that of the juridical trial. The statistical con¢dence interval is
derived from frequency data based upon repeated independent trials,164 which is
very di¡erent from a subjective assessment stemming from the accumulation of
diverse items of trial evidence.
Since trials are generally postdictive, the (inaccessible) correct probability,
based on (unavailable) ideal evidence, will either be one ^ the event happened ^
156 ibid120.
157 ibid 120.
158 The ¢rst three terms appear at ibid 48, and the last three at 82.
159 ibid 88.
160 N. Cohen n 147 above; Logue n 154 above, 91. Stein cites both, eg at 48 fn 51, but he also cites an
incisive critique of N. Cohen: at 84 fn 54: D. Kaye,‘Apples and Oranges: Con¢dence Coe⁄cients
and the Burden of Persuasion’ (1987) 73 Cornell L Rev 54.
161 The urn is opaque and the balls are all identical to the touch.The ball is replaced after each draw (or
alternatively the urn contains an in¢nite number of balls) and the urn is shaken.
162 The 95 per cent con¢dence interval is most commonly used. Brie£y, this can be roughlycalculated
as p72s. The symbol s represents the standard deviation, which can be estimated byO(pq/n),
where n is the number of samples, p is the frequencyof ‘successes’ (eg red balls) and q the frequency
of ‘failures’ (eg non-red balls):W. Mendhall, Introduction to probability and statistics (Massachusetts:
Duxbury Press, 1979) 239^240.This formula is based upon the mathematics of the normal func-
tionwhich can be taken as an approximation of the binomial probabilitydistribution.The normal
approximation is better for larger sample sizes, however Mendenhall suggests that where the fre-
quency is centred, as it is in the present case with p5 0.5, the normal approximation of a binomial
distribution of only ten samples is still ‘reasonably good’: at 203.
163 The technical meaning of the con¢dence interval is too complex to explore here. See eg I. Evett
and B.Weir, Interpreting DNA Evidence: Statistical Genetics for Forensic Scientists (Sunderland Mass:
SinauerAssociates, 1998) 65.
164 The concepts of frequency and repeated independent trials can be generalized to a degree by de
Finetti’s notion of exchangeability: de Finetti, La preŁ vision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjec-
tives, (1937) 7 Annales de l’institut Henri PoincareŁ 1, (English translation: De Finetti, B.,‘Foresight: its
logical laws, its subjective sources’ in H. Kyburg, and H. Smokler, Studies in Subjective Probability
(NewYork: J.Wiley,1964)); see also Logue n 154 above, 68^7.
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or zero ^ it did not.165 It follows that any assessment towards the middle of the
probability scale, no matter how weighty, cannot be considered resilient; fresh
clinching evidence could shift it signi¢cantly.This is not a problem for Stein since
he assumes that an increase in the weight of evidence, as well as bringing greater
resilience, also has the e¡ect that ‘[t]he estimate would come close to certainty’.166
There is, Stein suggests, a ‘logical relationship between probability estimates and
their weights’.167 Stein illustrates his position by reference to the issue of a defence
witness’s trustworthiness.168 With no evidence either way, and two alternatives to
choose from ^ trustworthy or not ^ Stein suggests that the initial probability of
trustworthiness is 0.5. Evidence then indicates that thewitness is a career criminal,
and the probability of trustworthiness drops to 0.2. Further evidence shows that
the witness, delivering exculpatory testimony, is the defendant’s brother, and the
probability of trustworthiness drops further to 0.05.This, for Stein, demonstrates
that ‘adherence [to a rigid weight standard] excludes from consideration middle-
range probabilities, far removed from both certainty. . . and impossibility. A fact-
¢nder certifying that ‘‘This testimony is as likely as it is not to be truthful’’must be
either lazy or uninformed.’169
But Stein’s example is contrived and his claim about a necessary correspon-
dence between weight and probability is fallacious. The Blue Bus and Prisoners
in theYard cases demonstrate that evidence of low weight can establish high and
even extreme probabilities; this is their point. In Stein’s witness example, it is
unclear why the fact-¢nder began at 0.5, the level of maximal uncertainty. The
lack of any speci¢c evidence about this witness does not necessarily render the
two alternatives ^ trustworthy, untrustworthy ^ equally probable.170 Given the
solemnity of the proceedings, penalties for perjury, and experience with other
witnesses, the fact-¢nder may have started with a generalization that witnesses
generally tell the truth in court, ascribing a probability of, say, 0.8 to the witness’s
trustworthiness.171 The increased weight of evidence ^ regarding the witness’s
criminal record and relationship with the defendant ^ may then have been
accompanied by an increase in uncertainty, not certainty.
The two items of evidence in Stein’s witness example pointed in the same direc-
tion. Stein’s ‘logical relationship between probability estimates and their weights’172
appears premised upon the various items of evidence being consonant.173 But it is
easy to create a plausible scenario in which dissonant evidence accumulates, posi-
tive and negative evidence cancelling each other out, providing no net increase in
165 Determinists would say that the same applies to predictions, and any probability other than zero
or one merely re£ects our lack of knowledge: Stein 126; E. Jaynes, ProbabilityTheory:The Logic of
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) Ch 10.
166 Stein 89.
167 ibid 176.
168 ibid 89^90.
169 ibid 90.
170 The conditions would not justify such a basic application of the principle of insu⁄cient reason:
ibid 44; Evett andWeir n 163 above, 7; Jaynes n 165 above, 331^333.
171 As does Stein in another example a few pages earlier at 77.
172 ibid 176.
173 G. ShaferAMathematicalTheory of Evidence (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,1976), 225^226,
notes that L. J. Cohen’s theory of weight also makes an assumption of consonance.
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certainty. The witness was a career criminal. But he converted to Christianity in
prison and claims to have turned a new leaf.The witness is testifying in favour of
his brother. But they have been estranged for many years. A fact-¢nder might be
informed and motivated, but still have considerable uncertainty as to a witness’s
trustworthiness.174
Stein’s commitment to the logical relationship betweenweight and certainty is
not unwavering. At one point he decries the postulate of ‘a linear progression rela-
tionship between the amount of information that fact-¢nders have and the accu-
racy of their decision’ as ‘unwarranted’, ‘fallacious’ and ‘plainly wrong’.175 But the
possibility that accumulating evidence will be more dissonant than consonant
could undermine the entire fact-¢nding enterprise. Since Thayer it has been
recognised as fundamental that probative evidence must be admitted unless there
is good reason for exclusion.176 Butwhat is the point of admitting aprobative item
of evidence if its impact may immediately be undone by the succeeding item of
evidence?177 Whether probative evidence is admitted or excluded, either way
there will be an‘informational void’.178 Stein appreciates that to abandon notions
of consonance and weight altogether is to engender a ‘global epistemic scepti-
cism’.179
However, scepticism can be averted without going to the other extreme and
adopting unwarranted assumptions of consonance and resilience. Amore modest
solutionwould be to adopt some version of the principle of total evidence.180 The
fact-¢nder should make reasonable e¡orts to ensure that any probability assess-
ment takes account of all available probative evidence. Questions as to the
whether this principle is a priorimay arise,181 but it would appear to re£ect human
experience that decisions made on a greater quantity of evidence are generally
better.182 This principle provides the necessary motivation for a fact-¢nder to
increase the weight of evidence. And it does so without the dubious assumption
that the evidence will be consonant, or that weight will be accompanied by resi-
lience or increased certainty. Provided the principle is compliedwith and relevant
evidence is not ignored, a low weight probability assessment should not be
viewed with any greater suspicion than aweighty probability assessment.
Stein expresses ambivalence about the notions of weight and resilience, and is
irresolute in a⁄rming the rationality of the fact-¢nding endeavour.This suggests
an alternative counterargument to free proof. As shown above, Stein was unsuc-
174 Actually, this is a di⁄cult example. Unlike a past event, certainty about awitness’s trustworthiness
may not be possible, evenwith ideal evidence.
175 Stein 122^123.
176 J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1896) 265;
J. Montrose,‘Basic concepts of the law of evidence’ (1954) 70 LQR 527^532; compare Stein 15.
177 Logue n 154 above, 86; I. Good,‘On the Principle of Total Evidence’ (1967) 17 BritishJournal for the
Philosophy of Science 319, 319.
178 Stein 131.
179 ibid 123.
180 See R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950)
211^213; Jaynes n 165 above, 338^339.
181 Good, n 177 above; B. Skyrms,Choice and Chance (Belmont:Wadsworth, 4th ed, 2000) 155.
182 See n 176 above; also consider the concept of ‘discrimination’ in scoring the accuracy of real world
forecasters: J. Yates, ‘Subjective Probability AccuracyAnalysis’, in G.Wright and P. Ayton (eds),
Subjective Probability (Chichester: JohnWiley & Sons,1994) 381, 391.
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cessful in ¢nding a role for evidence law in the value-laden risk-apportionment
decisions that supposedly pervade the fact-¢nding process. But he may have been
too swift in upholding the epistemic con¢dence doctrine. Stein’s analysis of
weight demonstrates that there are major uncertainties about how fact-¢nders
should best evaluate a body of evidence in their pursuit of factual accuracy.There
may be a signi¢cant role for evidence law in authoritatively and advantageously
resolving these issues.183 Of course, this assumes such issues are capable of resolu-
tion, and that the law would be an appropriate vehicle for doing so, which may
both be contentious propositions.
CONCLUSION
Stein’s Foundations challenges the orthodox view of evidence law. According to
Stein, factual accuracy is not the paramount goal. Evidence law’s central function
is to allocate the riskof error on the basis of cost-bene¢t analyses andmoral rights.
Stein views the increasing trend towards free proof as misguided and dangerous.
Fact-¢nders may be trustedwith purely epistemic enquiries, but risk-allocation is
value-laden and should be settled authoritatively. Stein considers it appropriate
that evidence law intervenewidely, guiding every stage of proceedingswhere evi-
dence is admitted, used and brought to account.
However, Stein’s argument fails at a number of points. He does not establish the
ubiquity of risk allocation or its ascendancy over factual accuracy and other con-
cerns. And his vision of evidence lawas a coherent and uni¢ed bodyof principle is
not sustained. On the contrary, his analyses suggest that evidence law is multi-
faceted, contestable, and frequently inconsistent.
But Stein does not leave the free proof agenda unscathed. On the contrary,
although the central thrust of Stein’s argument misses its mark, he raises impor-
tant questions about the values that evidence law should serve, and how this is
best achieved. Stein may not e¡ectively defend the existing structure of evidence
law, but he does demonstrate the need for us to understand it better beforewe tear
it down.
183 Among other inferential issues requiring resolution is the impact of the right to silence, in parti-
cular, on correct and incorrect acquittals: Stein 8^9; 158^165, 200^204; D. Seidmann and A. Stein,
‘The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A GameTheoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment
Privilege’ (2000) 114 Harv LR 430; G.Van Kessel,‘Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Inno-
cent: AClose Look at a NewTwist on the Right to Silence’ (2002) 35 Ind LR 925; D. Hamer,‘The
Privilege of Silence and the Persistent Risk of Self-Incrimination’ (2004) 28 Crim LJ 160^178,
200^216.
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